[Music] [Applause] On 2 August 1990, the Iraqi Army invaded
the Emirate of Kuwait, overwhelming the nation's military, toppling its government,
and annexing the territory for its own. These actions were the culmination of an
escalating dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. In the previous months, the
Iraqi regime made three demands: they ordered Kuwaiti forgiveness of billions of
dollars in loans that had been extended to Iraq during its war with Iran in the 1980s,
they insisted OPEC lower sales quotas, and they dictated that Kuwait halt the alleged
over-exploitation of the Ramela oil fields. Within four days of the invasion, the
Iraqis deployed five armored divisions, two mechanized divisions, and four
infantry divisions along the border. This aggression alarmed the international
community, which reacted with near unanimous condemnation. President George H.W. Bush and his
administration were genuinely concerned about a second attack by the Iraqi units that were
now massing along the border of Saudi Arabia. I want you to know that, first off,
we view this situation with gravity. We view it as a matter of grave concern to
this country and internationally as well. What Iraq has done violates
every norm of international law.
Within days, a brigade of the 82nd
Airborne Division deployed to Saudi Arabia. On 14 August, the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade
joined the 82nd. The 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, followed three days later. The
arrival of these rapidly deployable units would provide security and time for mechanized forces
to conduct the rail and port operations necessary to transport equipment to U.S. Central Command's
(U.S. CENTCOM's) area of responsibility. On 23 September, the 24th Infantry Division
and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) arrived in theater, along with
the rest of the 18th Airborne Corps. The 1st Cavalry Division followed in October. With
a balance of heavy and light units in theater, U.S. CENTCOM was confident in its ability to deter
any future Iraqi aggression into Saudi Arabia.
Within days of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the U.S.
Army's Seventh Corps in Germany received an alert to plan for possible deployment to Southwest Asia. [Music] Lieutenant General Frederick
Franks Jr., the Corps Commander, formed a Crisis Action Team to monitor the
situation and develop various courses of action. These scenarios analyzed potential missions and
what each would require from an operational, logistical, and personnel standpoint.
At a press conference on 8 November, President Bush announced that additional
units would be sent to the Gulf region.
In three months, the U.S. troop contribution to
the multinational force in Saudi Arabia has gone from ten thousand to two hundred and thirty
thousand. As part of Operation Desert Shield, I have today directed the Secretary of Defense
to increase the size of U.S. forces committed to Desert Shield to ensure that
the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that be
necessary to achieve our common goals. After President Bush's announcement, Secretary
of Defense Dick Cheney informed the public that Seventh Corps and 18th Airborne Corps
would serve as the tactical headquarters for the bulk of maneuver units under
Third Army or U.S.
Army Central's command. Seventh Corps consisted of the 1st Armored
Division under the command of Major General Ronald H. Griffith, the 3rd Armored Division
under the command of Major General Paul E. Funk, the 1st Infantry Division under the command of
Major General Thomas G. Rhame, and the 2nd ACR under the command of Colonel Leonard D. Holder.
Once in theater, Seventh Corps had the 1st Cavalry Division under the command of Brigadier
General John H.
Tilelli attached as well as the 1st Armored Division from the United Kingdom,
commanded by Major General Rupert A. Smith. Throughout December and into mid-January,
the units of Seventh Corps continued to prepare for their pending deployment. These
preparations included intense training on several key weapons platforms that had only been
recently added to the U.S. Army's inventory: the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the M1A1
Abrams tank, and the AH-64 Apache helicopter. These incorporated the latest
U.S. military weapons technology but were unproven in large-scale combat
operations. The soldiers of Seventh Corps were about to test themselves and their equipment
against a veteran Iraqi Army that possessed Soviet-made military hardware and occupied
improved defensive positions across Kuwait. As Seventh Corps conducted mission analysis and
course of action development, the 1st Infantry Division also prepared to deploy.
Fortunately
for the division, its cavalry squadron, the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, or 1-4 Cav, would
also benefit from these new weapons platforms, receiving M1A1 tanks upon arrival in theater.
Reconnaissance and security operations would become critical in the coming campaign, and the
story of 1-4 Cav, the 1st Infantry Division's cavalry squadron, reveals the importance of
those missions in large-scale combat operations. Before they could prove themselves, the U.S.
forces had to wait for the Iraqi government to respond to the U.N.
Resolution, which
threatened a deadline of 15 January 1991 to leave Kuwait or face the consequences. By
late 1990, the Iraqi Army fielded 32 divisions organized into seven corps. The Iraqis were
convinced that coalition forces would attack up the Wadi al-Batin, an intermittent riverbed.
The Wadi al-Batin runs from northeast to southwest across Saudi Arabia's Al-Dibdibah
Plain for approximately 75 kilometers. The Iraqis were also convinced that
coalition forces would support this attack with an amphibious assault into
Kuwait and erode their forces. In accordance with this
anticipated scheme of maneuver, the area over which the U.S. Seventh Corps would
attack was defended by the Iraqi Seventh Corps, which had been task-organized with six divisions
to cover the space west of the Wadi al-Batin. The 27th Infantry Division defended
the Wadi al-Batin, while the 25th, 31st, 48th, and 26th Infantry Divisions occupied
areas of operation extending to the west. The 26th ID would become the focus of the U.S.
Seventh Corps' plan for offensive operations. Each of the Iraqi divisions had a reconnaissance
battalion, a tank battalion, and defended their sectors with two brigades forward and one back.
Operationally, the Iraqi units neither defended in depth nor did they construct complex defensive
obstacles.
They dismissed the idea of an attack through the western desert as implausible based on
the difficulty of navigation and trafficability. As Saddam Hussein readied his forces for
combat, back at Fort Riley, 1-4 Cav under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Wilson
continued training and began staging vehicles and equipment to deploy. At that time, 1-4
Cav was a slightly under-strength J-Series Division Cavalry Squadron. A J-Series Cavalry
Squadron consisted of a headquarters troop, two ground cavalry troops, an aviation maintenance
troop, and two air cavalry troops. The ground troops were comprised of a headquarters
platoon, a maintenance section, a mortar section, and three platoons with six M3 Bradley
Cavalry Fighting Vehicles and 30 soldiers each. Lacking tanks, the division cavalry squadron
was only capable of conducting limited reconnaissance and security operations, either on
the ground or in the air, but not simultaneously.
Considered an enabling operation
by current U.S. Army doctrine, reconnaissance is performed before, during, or
after operations to provide commanders and staffs the information necessary to formulate,
confirm, or modify courses of action. Reconnaissance operations are
oriented on reconnaissance objectives. A reconnaissance objective is a terrain feature,
geographic area, enemy force, adversary, or other mission or operational variable about which the
commander wants to obtain additional information. The five types of reconnaissance operations are
area reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force, route reconnaissance, special
reconnaissance, and zone reconnaissance. Also considered enabling operations, security
operations are used to protect a designated force from surprise, observation,
or direct fire by enemy forces. The main difference between security operations
and reconnaissance is that security operations orient on the force or facility being protected,
while reconnaissance orients on the enemy and terrain.
The four types of security operations
are area security, screen, guard, and cover. 1-4 Cav, without additional armor support, would
only be capable of screening a protected force. Fortunately, the squadron would
receive 9 M1A1 tanks upon arrival in theater. These tanks provided 1-4
Cav with the firepower and protection it would need to fight for information
and protect the division's main effort. On 29 December 1990, 1-4 Cav and the bulk of the
1st Infantry Division departed Fort Riley, Kansas, for Saudi Arabia. Upon arrival, the squadron
offloaded its equipment or drew new equipment and then moved to Tactical Assembly Area (TAA)
Roosevelt, the 1st Infantry Division's staging area, to prepare for future operations. 16 January
came and went without an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. At 0238 on 17 January 1991, coalition
forces initiated a massive air campaign designed to destroy the Iraqis' ability
to conduct a coordinated defense. On the morning of 17 January, Major Sylvia
Maribel, the operations officer of the 701st Main Support Battalion, headed out of
TAA Roosevelt with a small advance party to establish the Division Support Area (DSA). They
chose a site 120 kilometers west of TAA Roosevelt and began to prepare the position to
support future offensive operations. Major Maribel quickly concluded that the remote
location and the lack of a robust security force put the sustainment units occupying the DSA
at significant risk should the Iraqis attack.
That evening, Major Maribel contacted the
division main command post. Colonel Bob Shadley, the division support commander, asked Major
Maribel if there was anything she needed. Major Maribel immediately requested the cavalry
squadron for support. Current Army doctrine design ates a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB)
to control the Division Support Area. If a MEB is not available, a brigade combat
team must be designated to control the area. Furthermore, depending on the situation,
including the threat, size of the support area, and number of units within the support
and consolidation areas, division and corps commanders may employ a Support Area Command
Post (SACP) to assist in controlling operations. The SACP enables division and corps commanders
to exercise command and control over disparate, functionally focused elements operating within
the support and consolidation areas that may exceed the effective span of control of the MEB or
division main command posts.
The SACP also allows the division commander to focus on operations
in the close area by controlling operations in the rear. The division's SACP normally co-locates
with the MEB, which provides the command post with signal connectivity, life support, security, and
workspace. Functions of the command post include planning and directing sustainment, terrain
management, movement control, and area security. When augmented by the MEB staff, the command
post may also plan and control combined arms operations with units under division or corps
control, manage airspace, and employ fires.
Threats in the Division Support
Area are categorized by the three levels of defense required to counter them.
Any or all threat levels may exist simultaneously in the Division Support Area. A Level
1 threat is a small enemy force that can be defeated by those units normally
operating in the echelon support area or by the perimeter defenses established by
friendly bases and base clusters. A Level 1 threat for a typical base consists of a squad-size
unit or smaller group of enemy soldiers.
A Level 2 threat is an enemy force that can be defeated by
a base or base cluster's defensive capabilities when augmented by a response force. A Level 3
threat is an enemy force or activity beyond the defensive capability of both the base and base
cluster and any local reserve or response force. Major Maribel's initial assessment
was correct. The 701st's location, now called DSA Junction City, was roughly 50
kilometers from the nearest maneuver units but less than 15 kilometers from Iraqi border
outposts. The presence of a lightly defended logistics base would present a tempting target
for Iraqi troops, but deploying forces forward of DSA Junction City might also reveal the
coalition's attack plans prematurely. Regardless, the division augmented the DSA with an element of
the cavalry squadron. On 20 January, 1-4 Cav began preparing Bravo Troop under the command of Captain
Mike Bills to move to DSA Junction City. At 0800 on the morning of 24 January, the troop, with
all its attachments, departed with 20 Bradleys, 6 M1A1s, and various engineer, air
defense, mortar, and support vehicles. With terrain features virtually non-existent,
the troop navigated almost exclusively using GPS, a new technology at the time.
Almost
immediately upon arriving at DSA Junction City, Captain Bills realized that one troop was
not going to be enough to screen the entire support area and requested additional forces.
The division dispatched the rest of 1-4 Cav, and over the next 24 days, the squadron conducted
area security and a stationary screen of the area. A type of security operation, a screen provides
early warning to a protected force. A screen may be either stationary or moving and is governed
by the five fundamentals of security operations: provide early and accurate warning,
provide reaction time and maneuver space, orient on the force, area, or facility, perform
continuous reconnaissance, and maintain enemy contact. Screen missions are defensive in nature
and accomplished by establishing observation posts oriented on an area of operation augmented with
patrols (mounted, dismounted, sensor, and aerial) to ensure surveillance of dead space. The
commander's guidance determines whether the screening force disrupts, harasses,
or destroys enemy reconnaissance forces. Observation posts are an important
element of the squadron's effort to establish and maintain security, and they
should be repositioned over extended distances. A squadron executing a stationary screen must
know the general trace of the screen and the time it must be established, the width of the screen
sector, the protected force or facility to screen, the rear boundary of the screening
force, and possible follow-on missions. Screens have certain execution considerations
that guide planning tasks for a screen, including: allow no enemy ground element to pass
through the screen undetected and unreported, maintain continuous surveillance of all avenues
of approach that affect the protected force, conduct counter-reconnaissance to destroy,
defeat, or disrupt enemy reconnaissance elements, locate and identify the lead elements
that indicate the enemy's main attack as prescribed in the enemy's order of battle or
intelligence preparation of the battlefield, determine the direction of enemy movement,
maintain contact and report threat activities even when displacing, impede and harass the enemy
without becoming decisively engaged, and detect and report all enemy elements attempting to pass
through the screen (both ground and aviation).
Despite the arrival of 1-4 Cav, the division was
still concerned that the DSA was isolated and exposed. To secure the DSA further, it tasked
3rd Battalion, 37th Armor, and 1st Battalion, 5th Field Artillery with augmenting 1-4 Cav.
Controlled by the division tactical command post, the new organization, referred to as Combat
Command Carter, performed area security operations to protect the DSA while also screening
the movement of maneuver units into sector. The first few days on the screen line
proved uneventful until 1 February, when 1-4 Cav made contact with the enemy. A patrol
of four Iraqi soldiers wandered across the border into Bravo Troop's screen and were quickly
captured.
Over the next 24 hours, the squadron began encountering Iraqi reconnaissance units
more frequently. The arrival of the rest of Combat Command Carter on 4 February was a
welcome sight as it allowed the squadron to reduce its portion of the screen line. This
added much-needed depth to 1-4 Cav's screen. The addition of three tank companies and
an infantry company from Task Force 3-37 Armor enabled 1-4 Cav's dismounted observation
posts to pass contact reports to Bradleys and tanks in overwatch, while ground surveillance
radar (GSR) monitored other avenues of approach. The squadron's AH-1 Cobra and OH-58 Charlie
Kiowa helicopters investigated long-range contacts. To conceal the location of ground
observation posts and screen positions, the support provided by 3-37 Armor enabled 1-4
Cav to rotate platoons from its two ground troops off the screen line and back to the DSA for
rest, maintenance, and additional training. With Combat Command Carter, Seventh
Corps now had three brigade-sized units forward of the main body screening the
border between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The 1st Cavalry Division had two brigades
forward with Combat Command Carter to the west.
Between 1 February and 17 February, Combat Command
Carter had numerous contacts with the Iraqi Army crossing into Saudi Arabia. These
included small dismounted patrols, Iraqi engineers emplacing obstacles,
and improving anti-tank ditches. For every contact made, there were at least
twice that number of phantom contacts. The ground surveillance radar monitoring the likely avenues
of approach had a difficult time distinguishing a company of Iraqi BTR-60 armored personnel
carriers from a herd of camels.
Pilots from outside the squadron frequently misidentified
friendly observation posts as enemy positions. Despite these challenges, by 14 February, 1-4
Cav's role in Combat Command Carter was complete, and the squadron was attached to 3rd Brigade to
be a part of what would become Task Force Iron. 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division provided
the headquarters for Task Force Iron. It consisted of two maneuver battalions,
1-4 Cav and 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry, with the 4th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery in
direct support. Task Force Iron also received general support reinforcing fire from
an additional 16 artillery battalions. 1st Battalion, 1st Aviation Brigade provided
attack helicopter support. Engineers from the 317th Engineer Battalion rounded out the task
force. Task Force Iron's mission was to conduct a covert breach of the berm on the Iraqi
border and then advance through the breach to establish a screen line for the rest of the 1st
Infantry Division once the main attack commenced. A breach is a synchronized combined arms
activity conducted to allow maneuver through an obstacle. The task force's success rested
on winning the counter-reconnaissance fight. Destroying the enemy's reconnaissance assets would
prevent the Iraqis from gathering information on the coalition's intentions.
This would go a
long way towards setting conditions for success later in the campaign. Army Techniques
Publication 3-20 describes counter-reconnaissance as a tactical mission task that encompasses
all measures taken by a commander to counter enemy reconnaissance efforts. It denies the enemy
commander the ability to conduct reconnaissance and develop situational understanding.
Countering enemy reconnaissance is the first and possibly most important step in
ensuring the main body can execute its mission. At 1100 on 15 February, Task Force Iron initiated
movement with two scout weapons teams from 1-4 Cav forward. 1-41 Infantry followed to the east,
and 1-4 Cav followed to the west. At 1130, 4-3 Field Artillery fired on Iraqi vehicles
that could observe the task force's movements. Upon reaching the border, engineers created
multiple breach lanes in only 15 minutes. The squadron advanced through the
breach lanes with the tanks in the lead. Shortly after noon, all of Task Force Iron was
through the berm and moving north.
By 1430, the entire task force was approximately two
kilometers inside Iraq but still short of the limit of advance along Phase Line Minnesota. The
task force spent the next day clearing the area and improving its position. At 2142, the task
force made contact with what was believed to be six vehicles moving from northwest to
southeast. Since the targets were beyond the limit of advance along Phase Line Minnesota,
the task force prepared to engage with indirect fire, but the vehicles quickly moved out of range
of the forward observers. At 2210, the task force observed a group of three vehicles moving north
to south. As the tanks attached to 1-41 Infantry prepared to engage, these targets also moved out
of range. At 2339, the task force reported the presence of possible Soviet-made BTRs accompanied
by at least one tank traveling southeast. Fifteen minutes later, at 2354, Charlie Company's
Bradleys made contact with three vehicles. They engaged with TOW missiles but could observe
no secondary explosions.
The risk of fratricide is inherent in all combat operations, but this danger
is only increased for reconnaissance and security assets operating forward of the main body. On
the evening of 16 February into the early morning hours of 17 February, inclement weather, limited
visibility, unfamiliarity with the terrain, the presence of enemy forces, and human error
would all come together in a tragic outcome. Army Techniques Publication 3-20.96 notes that
the counter-reconnaissance plan should address how to acquire and defeat enemy reconnaissance
elements. The intelligence section provides key input into the planning process. It identifies
avenues of approach into the unit sector, what type of enemy reconnaissance elements the
unit expects in the sector, and when they are most likely to move into the sector. The squadron
commander or S3 uses this information to formulate the counter-reconnaissance plan
and to task units to execute it.
Lieutenant Colonel Hillman was convinced they had
encountered an Iraqi reconnaissance battalion. According to the task force's
counter-reconnaissance plan, the Apaches of 1-1 Aviation would investigate and, if necessary,
destroy any long-range contacts identified by the observers. At 2326, the brigade commander ordered
the Apache support to launch. A platoon from 1-1 Aviation lifted off shortly after midnight on 17
February, accompanied by the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Hales. The division
tactical command post requested the task force turn off all ground surveillance radar to
avoid confusing the Apaches' radar sensors. To assist the Apache pilots,
the commander of 1-41 Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Hillman,
coordinated with them to identify the FLOT. At approximately 40 minutes after
midnight, the task force commander, Colonel David Weissman, suspended all indirect
fire to clear air space for the Apaches.
Vehicles, the box ABC-type vehicles, are
consistent with the type that was fired earlier. I have no forces forward at the 2-5 grid line. Colonel Weissman ordered
them to destroy the targets, but the pilots hesitated as they had
yet to make a positive identification. Well, I'm gonna tell you, it's hard to pull this
trigger. Back me up a little bit here. Tell me I'm fine. Heading zero-seven-zero,
thirty-eight hundred meters. The high winds and limited visibility
combined to misorient his crew. While Hales believed the
aircraft was oriented north, the high winds had caused the aircraft to drift
so that they were instead pointed northeast. Okay, I'll be firing in about 10 seconds. Roger. Lieutenant Colonel Hales
fired two Hellfire missiles. I hope it's enemy. That's all right.
Just stay on here it comes. That's one. I guess you could say that hit it. All right,
now let's take a look at the second one. Seconds later, the GSR
vehicle was destroyed as well. The three remaining scouts and all three
GSR crew members were wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Hales identified two individuals
staggering away from the second vehicle.
There are no hot targets. Got two personnel walking away from the
targets. Roger. You got guns? He ordered his wingman to engage
with the 30-millimeter cannon. It was then that Lieutenant Colonel
Hillman broke into the transmission. Roger. I was afraid of that.
I was really afraid of that. Major General Rhame, who had been monitoring
the engagement on the battalion's command net, ordered it broken off immediately. As the Apaches
returned to their assembly area, Task Force Iron continued the fight. For the next two hours, the
task force continued to have sporadic contact, but by 0300, enemy activity had ceased.
There were numerous mistakes made that night. Although Seventh Corps had standard operating
procedures for identifying friendly forces and preventing fratricide, many of these proved
ineffective during periods of limited visibility. Thermal tape applied to vehicles was often
indistinguishable at ranges over 1,000 meters. Infrared strobe lights provided a visual
marker under passive night vision devices but were not visible through the thermal systems
used by Army ground and air combat systems. The most common marking system was a
black inverted V painted on vehicle hulls. Another common marker was red VS-17 marker
panels tied to the back or top of vehicles. Although many field expedients were tried,
the most common limited visibility markings were red lens flashlights tied to
bustle racks on tanks and Bradleys. Unfortunately, these were not visible
through thermal sights.
In addition to vehicle recognition signals, commands exchange
liaisons, coordinate closely with adjacent units, co-locate command posts during complex operations,
and use control measures to prevent fratricide. Despite having coordinated with Lieutenant
Colonel Hillman to identify the FLOT, the FLOT does not apply to small, long-range reconnaissance
assets that may be positioned beyond it. In these circumstances, friendly forces forward of the FLOT
may have a restrictive fire support coordination measure such as a restrictive fire area or
a no-fire area placed around them to prevent friendly fire incidents. Commanders also establish
a limit of advance (LOA) to prevent fratricide. The limit of advance is a phase line used to
control the forward progress of an attack. The attacking unit does not advance any
of its elements or assets beyond the LOA, but it can push its security forces, such
as reconnaissance assets, to that limit. [Music] Because the enemy contact was well beyond the
FLOT and beyond the range of direct fire weapon systems, Task Force Iron should have continued to
observe rather than develop the situation by fire. The movement by the Iraqi reconnaissance
battalion opposite 1-41 Infantry was a demonstration designed to draw U.S.
Forces
into revealing their location and disposition. Task Force Iron's counter-reconnaissance operation
was complicated by the stresses associated with operating in unfamiliar terrain under limited
visibility. The open desert made it difficult for commanders to tie control measures such as
the FLOT and LOA to easily recognizable terrain features that could be used to control movement
and ensure an accurate common operating picture. Although they did not compromise their
position or yield ground to the Iraqis, two of the scouts lost their lives
in the confusion and miscommunication that clouded the battlefield that
night.
In the aftermath of the conflict, the U.S. Army made numerous changes to
prevent future incidents of fratricide. On the morning of 18 February, Task Force Iron was
ordered to displace south, back through the berm. As the task force withdrew through the passage,
they received indirect fire that was unnerving but inaccurate. The squadron moved
to Tactical Assembly Area Respite, which was a necessary reprieve after
almost 30 days of continuous operations. Since the beginning of the air campaign
on 17 January, coalition air strikes and long-range naval gunfire had been bombarding Iraqi
forces inside Kuwait and Iraq.
By mid-February, the Iraqis were no closer to leaving
Kuwait than when the campaign began a month earlier. On 22 February, Seventh Corps
received Third Army Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 4-4, which confirmed the ground campaign
would commence at 0100 on 24 February. The FRAGO reminded Seventh Corps commanders that,
without notice, the National Command Authority may change this date. Commanders must be able to
execute Operations Order 001 Desert Storm on time. Third Army designated Seventh Corps as the
main effort and tasked it with penetrating the Iraqi defenses and destroying
their operational center of gravity, the Republican Guard. The Seventh Corps
commander, Lieutenant General Frederick Franks, tasked the 1st Infantry Division with
breaching the main Iraqi defensive belt. Once complete, the 1st Infantry Division would
conduct a forward passage of lines with the United Kingdom's 1st Armored Division so that
the British could attack east to destroy the 52nd Armored Division, the Iraqi Seventh Corps' mobile
reserve.
Because the goal was to push the bulk of the U.S. Seventh Corps' combat power forward to
fix and destroy the Republican Guard, the 1st Infantry Division planned to execute the breach
like a gap crossing rather than a penetration. The operation planned for multiple phases.
First, the division artillery would target Iraqi defensive positions with over 90,000 rounds
during a two and a half hour preparation fire. Preparation fire is normally a high volume
of fires delivered over a short period of time to maximize surprise and shock
effect. Preparation fire can include electronic attack and should be synchronized
with other electronic warfare activities. The 1st Infantry Division's fire support
coordinator was responsible for coordinating indirect fire from four divisions and three
separate field artillery brigades.
The goal was to allow the assault forces to get within 200 to
300 meters of the Iraqi lines before shifting fire and drawing the defenders out of their positions
when the assault force was on top of them. During the second phase, the two lead brigades
would penetrate the Iraqi defenses while the third brigade prepared to follow and exploit the initial
attack. As the lead task forces of each brigade cleared a zone of enemy positions, the follow-on
forces would continue to expand this penetration. The battle handover line, designated Phase Line
New Jersey, was secured by three brigades abreast. The final phase consisted of passing the UK's 1st
Armored Division through 1st Infantry Division in order for it to turn east and
attack the Iraqi 52nd Armor Division.
With all the preliminary moves completed, the
coalition land component was prepared to attack. On 24 February, the 18th Airborne Corps on the coalition's western flank would initiate
the main offensive early on the morning of 24 February. Farther east, JFC East, JFC
North, MARCENT, and the 18th Airborne Corps along with Seventh Corps were pushing the
remaining Iraqi forces into a pocket near Basra. First Infantry Division was given a new
mission, but before that could happen, the division was in desperate need of
ammunition and fuel after its long night. Once resupplied, the division was
tasked with seizing a large objective approximately 50 kilometers north of Kuwait City, designated Objective Denver. It consisted of
a road network that included the Basra Highway and numerous smaller roads the Iraqi Army could
use to escape north.
1-4 Cav intended to screen the division's western flank to provide sufficient
warning of impending counterattacks. The division expected to quickly consolidate on the far side of
the objective. However, difficult terrain combined with enemy resistance slowed its movement to a
crawl. 1-4 Cav ended up seizing the northern edge of Objective Denver and establishing a blocking
position by 1630 to prevent the further withdrawal of Iraqi forces north. Within 45 minutes, the
entire squadron was involved in a firefight. The Iraqis were shocked to find American troops
along the highway.
Some chose to fight their way through, only to be destroyed by the squadron's
Bradleys and M1A1s. Others chose to avoid the road altogether and tried to bypass the squadron
through the oil fields east of the objective. The rest surrendered. By 1600, 1-4 Cav
had captured over 450 Iraqi soldiers. Two hours later, that number had
swelled to over one thousand. All through the night, the squadron held
the northwest portion of Objective Denver.
As the sun rose that morning, the squadron was
finally relieved by the rest of 2nd Brigade. For over 14 hours, the squadron had held its
position beyond the range of supporting artillery and with only intermittent communication with the
rest of the division. The battle for Objective Denver had ended, and the coalition war would soon
follow suit. On 28 February 1991, President George Bush declared a ceasefire, which was to take
effect at 0800 the following day. On 3 March 1991, the Iraqi delegation agreed to all points
on U.N. Resolution 686, ending hostilities. All of the coalition's
operational goals had been met. Kuwait had been liberated, its government had
been restored, the Iraqi Army had been forcibly removed and crippled in the process.
All of
this for incredibly few coalition casualties. The story of 1-4 Cav demonstrates the versatility
and flexibility of the division cavalry squadron. Throughout Operation Desert Storm, 1-4 Cav
routinely operated as the vanguard of the 1st Infantry Division. Operating as a true combined
arms team, the troopers overwhelmed the Iraqi Republican Guard time and again by synchronizing
attack aviation, indirect fire, and maneuver. Throughout their numerous engagements, the
officers, NCOs, and soldiers of 1-4 Cav applied the fundamentals of security operations
to provide early warning, protect the main body, and defeat enemy reconnaissance.
Above all, they
took the initiative and exercised mission command to maintain the division's tempo by performing
aggressive reconnaissance and security operations. [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] If he continues to have an army, then
he continues to be a threat somewhere, and I don't want my children or grandchildren or
great-grandchildren coming back to this region and fighting against Iraq
again. That's how I feel. Peaceful efforts to disarm
the Iraqi regime have failed again and again because we are
not dealing with peaceful men.
May God bless our country and all who defend..